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NOTES
Same-Sex Marriage
"[Fireedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow offreedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."1
L Introduction
According state recognition to opposite-sex marriages while
denying the same recognition to same-sex2 marriages denies same-sex
couples equal protection of the laws and abridges the basic freedom
of all persons to decide with whom to form their most enduring,
intimate, and interdependent associations Despite prominent
proclamations of equal protection and liberty in American law,4 state
and federal courts have rejected six same-sex marriage test cases
I West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (children
cannot be required to salute the flag in public schools).
2 The term "same-sex" marriages in this Note refers to all marriages that are not
considered by the state to be opposite-sex marriages. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (holding that a marriage of
two persons of the same sex is not authorized by state statutes). The reasons for this
definition become clear in the text, particularly infra note 37, discussing marriage cases
involving transsexuals.
I See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624
(1980). "The freedom to choose our intimates and to govern our day-to-day
relationships with them.., is the foundation for the one responsibility among all others
that most clearly defines our humanity." Id. at 692. "mhe freedom of intimate
association extends to homosexual associations as it does to heterosexual ones. All the
values of intimate association are potentially involved in homosexual relationships; all
have been impaired, in various ways, by government restrictions. . . ." Id. at 682.
1 Indeed, the very first sentence of the Constitution asserts that securing "the
Blessings of Liberty" is one of its essential purposes. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl. The
Constitution further provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For state
constitutional provisions, see infra note 179.
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seeking to enforce these guarantees.' Courts have ruled essentially
that same-sex couples cannot be allowed to marry because only
opposite-couples can marry," a circular argument that ignores the rich
history of same-sex marriage.
This Note will review the history of same-sex marriage as
well as recent and pending cases considering same-sex marriage. It
will then establish why existing state constitutional rights require that
same-sex marriages receive protection equal to that accorded
opposite-sex marriages, and why the recognition of same-sex
marriage in one state could lead to its recognition in all American
states.
II. A Brief History of Same-Sex Marriage
A. Evolution of Marriage
"In order to trace marriage in its legal sense to its ultimate source, we must
therefore try to find out the origin of the habit from which it sprang..7
One of the primary barriers that has stood in the way of
accepting same-sex marriage cases in the United States has been the
tendency of judges to focus only on their own understanding of
marriage, which is drawn primarily from their own experience and
s The cases are: Dean v. Barry, C.A. No. 90-13892 (D.C. Super. 1991); Baehr v.
Lewin, 5. CC 91-1394 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 1991); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. App. Div. 1 1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). There
have also been cases involving the dissolution of same-sex unions in which one partner
claimed there had been a valid marriage and the other claimed there had not been.
These cases tend to involve additional questions of fraud and substantial unfairness and
are not entirely within the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Homosexuals 'Right To Marry: A Constitutional Test
and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 193, 194 (1979) [hereinafter
Homosexuals'Right to Marry].
6 See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (defining marriage as inherently and exclusively heterosexual).
7 1 EDWARD A. WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 28 (5th ed.
1922) [hereinafter WESTERMARCK].
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
from comparatively recent history Because same-sex marriage is
less visible in contemporary American culture than it has been at
other times in history, the judges tend to see the concept of same-sex
marriage as something new and strange, rather than a fundamental
tradition; they consequently conclude that same-sex marriage is an
oxymoron, not a right.' To understand why this conclusion is
mistaken, it is necessary to take a more comprehensive view of the
history of marriage.
The history of marriage in a sense extends back even further
than the existence of the human species. Seminal sociologist Edward
Westermarck suggested that the institution of human marriage
probably
developed out of a primeval habit . . . of a man and
a woman (or several women) to live together, to have
sexual relations with one another, and to rear their
offspring in common .... This habit was sanctioned
by custom, and afterwards by law, and was thus
transformed into a social institution.10
Similarly,
it has been proposed that the origin of the habit lies
in: the instinct to preserve the next generation and,
therefore, the species; the instinct to care and provide
for defenseless offspring; and the instinct to remain
with a partner who has been the source of sexual
'Apparently, no openly Gay judge has ever been asked to rule on the validity of
same-sex marriage. See Speaking for Ourselves, Draft Directory of Lesbian & Gay
Elected Officials, (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Washington, D.C.), Fall 1991,
at 6 (listing all of the openly Gay judges appointed or elected in the United States, none
matching any of the ruling judges in any same-sex marriage decision). See also THE
ALYSON ALMANAC 23 (1989) (the first openly Gay judge in the United States was
appointed in 1979 in California by then-Governor Jerry Brown, who also appointed the
second, third, and fourth openly Gay judges in this country).
' See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Ky. 1973) (holding there is
no constitutional sanction or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the
same sex).
10 WESTERMARCK, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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pleasure even after the sexual relations have ceased.
It was this habit which evolved into custom and
which, in turn, resulted in the social institution of
marriage."
The instinct to form enduring interdependent associations is thus one
of the factors that contributed to the evolution and survival of the
human species. In this sense the roots of the institution of marriage
presumably extend to the ancestors of the human species, as an
integral part of life among all life forms that develop enduring,
interdependent, and intimate relationships."
B. Ancient Roots of Same-sex Marriage
It would be a mistake to believe, as some courts have ruled,
that these relationships and families, the unions that later became
institutionalized marriages and family structures, were exclusively
heterosexual in nature.1 3
The impression that infra-human mammals more or
less confine themselves to heterosexual activities is a
distortion of the fact which appears to have originated
in a man-made philosophy, rather than in specific
observations of mammalian behavior. Biologists and
psychologists who have accepted the doctrine that the
only natural function of sex is reproduction, have
t Catherine M. Cullem, Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex
Marriage, 15 TuLsA L.J. 141, 146-47 (1979) (citations omitted).
" Indeed, Westermarck observed that marriage is "probably an inheritance from
some pre-human ancestor," and that "similar habits are found among many other species
of the animal kingdom." WESTERMARCK, supra note 7, at 28.
1s At least two courts have asserted that marriage was created simultaneously with
the Old Testament as, by definition, an institution uniquely involving one man and one
woman. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("The institution
of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.") (quoting Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972)).
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simply ignored the existence of sexual activity which
is not reproductive. They have assumed that
heterosexual responses are a part of an animal's
innate, "instinctive" equipment, and that all other
types of sexual activity represent "perversions" of the
"normal instincts." Such interpretations are,
however, mystical.14
In fact, "sexual contacts between individuals of the same sex are
known to occur in practically every species of mammal which has
been extensively studied."1 5  Contrary to the curious assertion
contained in certain statutes that homosexual activity is "against
nature," 6 this activity is, and presumably has always been, a normal
part of life for many species. Therefore, the natural evolutionary
process of marriage, based on traditions of interdependent
relationships, presumably included same-sex relationships from the
beginning -- even before the arrival of the human species.
Certainly by the time of recorded marriage history, historians
find an "ancient and powerful tradition of same-sex marriage. "17
Laws governing same-sex marriage apparently date at least as far
back as the Hittites, 8 who ruled Asia Minor more than three
thousand years ago." Cicero, whose knowledge of Roman law under
the Republic was "exhaustive,"2 is quoted as considering same-sex
marriage legally binding. 21 By the time the Roman Republic became
the Roman Empire, "[a]mong the lower classes informal [same-sex
unions] may have predominated, but marriages between males or
14 ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 448 (1953).
'I Id.
NE See Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okl. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890
(1986) (reversing conviction for "Crime Against Nature," a phrase that would seem to
refer to polluting the environment but that in fact was applied to sex between two
males).
'7 Telephone Interview with John Boswell, History Department Chair, Yale
University (Nov. 12, 1991).
18 JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANrrY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 21
(1980) [hereinafter BOSWELL].
19 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 573 (1989).
" BOSWELL, supra note 18, at 69.
21 Id.
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between females were legal and familiar among the upper classes. "22
Indeed, the history of the time suggests almost an inversion of
modern conceptions of the relationship between homosexuality and
heterosexuality:
The biographer of Elagabalus maintains that after the
emperor's marriage to an athlete from Smyrna, any
male who wished to advance at the imperial court
either had to have a husband or pretend that he did.
Martial and Juvenal both mention public ceremonies
involving the families, dowries, and legal niceties.
Martial points out that.., marriage took place under
the same law which regulated marriage between men
and women . . . . Nero married two men in
succession, both in public ceremonies with the ritual
appropriate to legal marriage.23
Same-sex marriages continued and were well-known in the Roman
Empire until the mid-fourth century.' While the precise definition
of marriage has varied from one community to another and from one
era to the next,2" there is a tradition of Christian same-sex marriage
ceremonies celebrating unions that were considered marriages in the
same sense in which opposite-sex couples married. 26 The tradition of
same-sex marriage transcends thousands of years of human history.
In a sense, same-sex marriages have existed longer than the human
race itself, dating back to the first species to form enduring and
intimate relationships.
2 Id. at 82.
23 Id. (citations omitted).
24 Id. at 123-24.
2 WESTERMARCK, supra note 7, at 26.
26 Telephone interview with John Boswell, History Department Chair, Yale
University (Nov. 12, 1991).
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C. Same-sex Marriage Today
At present, despite American assertions of liberty and
equality, neither the Federal Government nor any American state
recognizes same-sex marriage. Mayor David Dinkins of New York
City recently signed an executive order permitting homosexual
couples to register as unmarried "domestic partners. "27 The executive
order allows those registered as domestic partners to have the same
legal rights as married spouses in qualifying for apartments and
visiting partners at hospitals and jails.28 Although no jurisdiction now
permits same-sex marriages, same-sex couples continue to wed even
though they are denied the protection of the laws.
The Metropolitan Community Churches and the Unitarian
Universalist Association of Congregations both perform same-sex
"unions," and although Unitarians carefully point out that no two
marriages are the same, same-sex unions can be called marriages and
are considered equal to opposite-sex marriages.29 Additionally,
domestic partnership laws passed in some two dozen municipalities
in the United States provide same-sex couples some, but not all, of
the benefits accorded opposite-sex couples."
27 Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in New York,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al.
I Id. at B3. Approximately two dozen other cities, counties, or states have
established some form of recognition of domestic partnerships. Id.
" Telephone Interview with Rev. Darrel Burger, Unitarian Universalist Association
of Congregations (Nov. 19, 1991). Rev. Burger pointed out that no two marriages are
the same, but that same-sex marriages, usually called "holy unions" because of their lack
of legal status, are considered equal to opposite-sex marriages. Id.
o These ordinances have also been passed in Canada, with Ottawa, Toronto,
Vancouver, and the Yukon Territory passing legislation providing benefits to domestic
partners. Kay Longcope, Gay Couples Fight for Spousal Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
4, 1991, at 38.
Advocates within the Gay community have debated the relative merits of
marriage and domestic partnership. See Paula Ettelbrick & Tom Stoddard, Same-Sex
Marriage and Domestic Partnership, A Conversation for Many Voices (available from
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York, N.Y.). Domestic partnership
may offer greater flexibility than marriage in allowing people to define their own
relationships and to order their own lives, rather than submitting to a pre-ordained
institutional structure. See, e.g., Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92
COLum. L. REv. 1164 (1992). One may also question whether the state should be
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Moreover, contemporary American culture has begun to
include a renaissance of Gay"1 parenting, described by one leading
news weekly as the "gayby boom." 2 Estimates place the number of
Gay parents, including parents whose children were born in the
context of a prior heterosexual relationship and same-sex couples who
have adopted or who have reproduced with the help of friends or
artificial insemination, between three and five million. 3 According
to a recent American Bar Association study, eight to ten million
children are currently being raised in three million Gay households.3 4
One of the inevitable results of this renaissance has been to
change the definition of family. "Family has become a fluid
involved at all in sanctifying personal relationships like marriage or domestic
partnership, and whether employers should provide extra compensation in the form of
benefits to some employees but not others, based on the employees' personal
relationships outside the workplace. Advocates of polygamous or plural marriage might
argue that official recognition exclusively of two-party unions discriminates on the basis
of religion. All of these policies blur the separation of personal, professional, and legal
aspects of people's lives, in a sense inviting the corporation and the state into the
bedroom by saying that the state and the company should value some people more highly
than others based on their personal, and ordinarily private, relationships. See, e.g., John
C. Beattie, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Protection of
Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINOS L.J. 1415 (1991); Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic
Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Benefits for Gay Couples (and
Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1990). These questions, although important in their
own right, are beyond the scope of this Note. This Note addresses the narrow and
discrete problem of government discrimination against same-sex couples in the marriage
laws, and argues that if government recognizes the marriages of opposite-sex couples,
it must give equal protection to the marriages of same-sex couples.
s" The term "Gay" in this Note refers to all members of the Gay community,
including, but not limited to, Lesbians, Gay men, bisexual persons regardless of gender,
and transsexuals who identify themselves as Gay.
32 Eloise Salholz et al., The Future of Gay America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at
20. Although the current generation may be the first to have been given such a catchy
name, Gay parenting is not a new phenomenon. See BOSWELL, supra note 18, at 285.
" Salholz, supra note 32, at 20. The article adds that "[a) number of organizations
have sprung up to meet their social needs. San Francisco boasts the Lesbian and Gay
Parenting Group, storytelling hours for tots at gay bookstores and Congregation Sha'ar
Zahav, a largely gay synagogue with a Hebrew school for members' children." Id. See
also Jean Seligman et al., Variations on a Theme, NEWSWEEK, Winter/Spring 1990, at
38 (citing an estimate by Roberta Achtenberg, executive director of the National Center
for Lesbian Rights, that the number of Gay mothers and fathers exceeds two million).
I Craig Dean, Legalize Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at 15.
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concept,""1 with census reports showing fewer than twenty-seven
percent of American families conforming to the stereotypical model
and more than 1.6 million same-sex couples living together. 6 Given
the sheer number of same-sex couples, and the number of children
being raised in Gay households, it is inevitable that courts will
continue to hear from Gay families seeking equal protection of the
laws for their relationships.
III. Recent Case Law
Despite six separate challenges to state and federal denial of
equal protection for same-sex marriages, no American case has yet
accorded same-sex marriages legal status equal to that granted to
opposite-sex marriages." In some cases, even marriage statutes that
11 Seligman, supra note 33, at 38 (quoting Arthur Leonard, Professor of Law, New
York Law School).
Seligman, supra note 33, at 38.
'7 Courts have reached different results concerning the validity of marriages
involving transsexuals. In Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.D.A. 1970), an English
court held that a person who completed gender reassignment surgery was nevertheless
incapable of marrying a man because she was not "naturally capable of performing the
essential role of a woman in marriage." Id. at 48. Describing the case as an
"essentially pathetic, but almost incredible story," the court examined the surgical
process in remarkably graphic detail. Id. at 37. The court observed that "the
association of ideas connected with these words or phrases are [sic] so powerful that they
tend to cloud clear thinking." Id. at 36. The court developed a five-part test to
determine gender. Id. at 44. The court reasoned that because Mrs. Corbett had male
chromosomes and had been born with male physiology, she was incapable of marrying
a male and the marriage was void. Id. at 46-47, 51. The court decided that Mrs.
Corbett was a man, but one wonders how the court would have ruled if she had tried to
marry a woman.
Two New York cases reached the same result as Corbett, but with
distinguishable fact patterns. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup.
Ct. 1971), a pre-operative transsexual represented herself as a female and married a
male. The couple never lived together or had sexual relations. Id. at 500. Although
the court did not find specifically that the wife in Anonymous had become a female, it
expressly reserved the possibility that her sex had "been changed to female by operative
procedures," and held simply that the marriage was void because both parties were male
at the time of the ceremony. Id.
Similarly, in Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974), a
transsexual represented himself as a male and married a female. Id. at 713. The wife
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decided that she had been deceived and sued for annulment. Id. The court asserted that
marriage exists "for the purpose of begetting offspring." Id. at 717. The court
concluded that, because the husband did not have male sexual organs and the capacity
to procreate as a male, the marriage was void. Id. at 712. Both Anonymous and
Frances B. involved deception and were tried in a jurisdiction where marriages, whether
heterosexual or homosexual, can be annulled if either party is found incapable of
procreating with the other. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7(3) (McKinney 1988) ("A
marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction
if either party thereto [ius incapable of entering into the married state from physical
cause"). The cases are therefore to be distinguished from cases that do not involve fraud
or that take place in jurisdictions that do not place such a premium on procreation.
Exactly such a case arose in M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976). M.T. and J.T. met when M.T. was a pre-operative transsexual. Id.
at 205. The couple moved in together and J.T. paid for M.T.'s gender reassignment
surgery. Id. The couple subsequently married, had intercourse, and lived together as
husband and wife. Id. After more than two years of marriage, J.T. left M.T. and
ceased to support her. Id. After painstaking analysis of a substantial body of expert
testimony concerning gender and gender identity, the court concluded that M.T. was
female and that the marriage was valid. Id. at 207.
It would be comforting to conclude that the M. T. opinion carried the day and
was universally followed, but the case of In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987), renders such a conclusion impossible. In Ladrach, a
male and a female transsexual were refused a marriage license because both parties were
male on their birth certificates. Id. at 829. The court characterized M. T. as "liberal,"
and cited Corbett for the proposition that the determination of sex at birth, as indicated
on the birth certificate, is final and cannot be changed absent a typographical error. Id.
at 832. But the court did note that fifteen states do allow transsexuals to change the sex
indication on their birth certificates, and stated: "It seems obvious to the court that if a
state permits such a change of sex on the birth certificate of a post-operative transsexual,
whether by statute or administrative ruling, then a marriage license, if requested, must
issue to such a person provided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled." Id. at 830.
The Ladrach decision thus seems to fall somewhere between Corbett and M. T.
In all these cases, the arguments focus on whether the spouses are of the same
or opposite sex. As the differences between Corbett and M. T. illustrate, this question
is not always answered the same way. Perhaps of more fundamental importance, the
lengthy discussions of expert testimony illustrate the complexity of the issue and the fact
that there is no unanimity as to what is meant by the terms "male" and "female," and
that assigning persons to one category or the other is not always an exact task. Indeed,
one expert in M. T. testified that "no person is 'absolutely' male or female." M.T., 355
A.2d at 206. The multiplicity of indicia of gender can produce contradictory results, and
suggest that there may be more than two possible answers to the question of what is a
person's sex. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many Sexes are There?, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1993, at A29. If this view is correct, then the differences between "same-sex"
and "opposite-sex" marriages may not be as clear as one might expect; indeed, the terms
themselves may not always have any real meaning. Treating same-sex marriages equally
to opposite-sex marriages would hopefully eliminate the need for courts to ask these
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are gender-neutral and state no requirement that couples be opposite-
sex have been judicially interpreted to prohibit same-sex marriages."
The cases have asserted several reasons, each of which is fatally
flawed, for maintaining this unequal treatment.
A. Baker v. Nelson
The first suit by a same-sex couple seeking equal protection
for their marriage was filed in Minnesota by Richard Baker and
James McConnell, who had been denied a marriage license "on the
sole ground that [they] were of the same sex, it being undisputed that
there were otherwise no statutory impediments to a heterosexual
marriage by either petitioner."39 Although the Minnesota marriage
laws did not contain any express requirement that couples be
opposite-sex,4 ° the court pointed out that some sections contained
references to "husband and wife" and "bride and groom," 4' and that
dictionaries defined "marriage" as a union between persons of the
opposite sex.42 Noting that the Minnesota marriage statutes "date
from territorial days,"43 the court decided that same-sex marriages
were outside the intent of the "original draftsmen"' of the marriage
laws.
The court decided that because the marriage laws were not
intended specifically to authorize same-sex marriages, such marriages
were necessarily prohibited.45  This form of reasoning directly
contradicts the foundation principle that in a "free" society, anything
questions, and thus, as a legal matter, could eliminate this problem in the marriage
context.
' See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
" Bakerv. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185,185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
0 Id.
4' Id. at 185-86.
42 Id. at 186 n.1 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)
and BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)).
43 Id. at 186.
" Id.
4Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
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not prohibited is permitted; it is only in "command" societies that the
reverse is considered true, that anything not specifically permitted is
prohibited." Ordinarily, the fact that the statutes contained no
prohibition against same-sex marriages would mean that those
marriages are permitted, but the court decided that because there was
no explicit authorization, same-sex marriages were prohibited.
The court's reason for this inversion of American thinking
becomes clear in its consideration of the constitutional arguments in
the case. The plaintiffs asserted that the state's refusal to recognize
their marriage was a violation of the First, Eighth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.47 The court dismissed
the couple's argument that the state was interfering with their First
Amendment rights of expression and association, as well as their
Eighth Amendment argument that the denial of a marriage license
imposed a cruel and unusual punishment.48 Although the court
declined to assert any reasons for dismissing these arguments, its
' For an illustration of this distinction, see On the Record, TIME, Mar. 18, 1985,
at 73 ("In Germany, under the law everything is prohibited except that which is
permitted. In France, under the law everything is permitted except that which is
prohibited. In the Soviet Union, everything is prohibited, including that which is
permitted. And in Italy, under the law everything is permitted, especially that which is
prohibited."). See also Don Wallace, Jr., Address to the 33rd Annual Meeting of the
Section of Antitrust Law of the America Bar Association, 54 ANTrrRusT L.J. 571, 571
(1985) ("There was a column written - and he actually did this -- in the Washington
Post by Lloyd Cutler while he was counsel to President Carter. He was trying to
distinguish between the Anglo American, German, and French approach to the law. He
said of the common law approach, that anything was allowed unless it were prohibited
by law; the German approach was that everything is prohibited unless permitted by law;
and the French approach is that everything is prohibited but anything can be arranged.")
(emphasis omitted).
On the application of this distinction in the United States, see, e.g., David
Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Constitutional Purposes
of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 355, 381 (1987) ("[Jln our legal system,
everything is permitted except that which is prohibited by proper legal action.").
Exceptions to the general principle that everything not prohibited is permitted are urged
in the area of protection from discrimination. See, e.g., Douglass G. Boshkoff, Private
Parties and Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 62 IN. L.J. 159, 181-82 (1987)
(asserting that a statute prohibiting bankruptcy-based discrimination should be interpreted
"in pursuit of sound bankruptcy policy.").
"' Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 n.2.
4 Id.
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discussion of the other constitutional claims explains the disposition
of the First and Eighth Amendment claims.49 The court wrote:
These constitutional challenges have in common the
assertion that the right to marry without regard to the
sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons
S. .. The institution of marriage as a union of man
and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children with a family, is as old as the
book of Genesis.5°
There are several problems with this argument. First, it
ignores the tremendous history of same-sex marriages, both before
and after the book of Genesis was written, and the current abundance
of same-sex marriages that involve procreation5" and the rearing of
children with a family. 2 Second, it creates a rather unusual
establishment clause problem. The justices evidently asserted their
own religious view, contrary to theological and historical study, that
marriage exists not as a legal arrangement but rather as an
unchanging rite handed down with the Old Testament.53 Third, it
overlooks the vast imprecision of the correlation between marriage
and procreation; that is, the huge numbers of married couples without
children and unmarried couples, heterosexual and homosexual, with
children.' Fourth, the argument is circular: it claims that the reason
only opposite-sex couples can marry is because only opposite-sex
couples can marry. Circular arguments, while internally irrefutable,
" Id. The court did explain that it felt the Eighth Amendment claim was "without
merit," but this assertion is a conclusion, not a reason. Id.
o Id. at 186.
SI In the San Francisco area alone, at least 1000 children have been born to gay or
lesbian couples from 1985 to 1990. Salholz, supra note 32, at 20.
52 Salholz, supra note 32, at 20 (estimating that between three and five million Gay
parents are raising children). While same-sex couples may have been less visible in
1972 than they are today, they were probably as numerous; even if Mr. Baker and Mr.
McConnell had been the only same-sex couple in the world, it would not in itself justify
depriving them of the equal protection of the laws, which is guaranteed to all persons.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5 See BoSwELL, supra note 18, at 26.
5 See Seligman, supra note 33, at 38; Salholz, supra note 32, at 20.
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are not a form of reasoning at all; they certainly cannot justify state
interference with a right as fundamental as marriage."5
The court then used its assertion that a same-sex marriage is
not a marriage to distinguish cases addressing the right of privacy and
the right of equal protection in the marriage context. 6 In Griswold
v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court established the right of married
couples to use contraception, and hence to engage in non-procreative
sex."8 By establishing this right, Griswold separated marriage from
procreation; opposite-sex couples exercising their right to use
effective contraception are no more able to procreate than same-sex
couples. Additionally, Baker and McConnell pointed out that many
opposite-sex couples cannot or do not procreate, but are nevertheless
allowed to marry and to remain married.59 Recognizing non-
procreative opposite-sex marriages while refusing to recognize non-
procreative same-sex marriages denies same-sex couples the equal
protection of the Griswold decision. The Minnesota court
nevertheless asserted that marriage, even when not procreative, could
only be an opposite-sex relationship.6" Indeed, the court appeared to
have been so flustered by the very idea of a same-sex couple
expecting the same rights as an opposite-sex couple that, in describing
Justice Goldberg's famous Griswold concurrence,61 the Justices
I See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals.").
' Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
17 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
I d. at 485.
Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. Couples, regardless of sex, cannot procreate after a
certain age. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLs, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 772 (4th ed. 1990) ("modem verifiable medical records show no births to
women over 60, and births to women over 50 are statistically insignificant."); THE
GUINNESS BOOK OF WORLD RECORDS 15 (27th ed. 1989) ("The oldest recorded mother
of whom there is satisfactory verification [gave birth] when her age was 57 years 129
days."); Telephone Interview with Dr. Albert E. Levin, M.D. (Apr. 1991) (it is
exceptional for women in their fifties to be able to have children). Nevertheless, the
elderly are not prohibited from marrying nor are their marriages terminated once the
function of raising children in a family is completed or no longer possible. Clearly,
society has recognized that there is more to marriage than the simplification endorsed
by the Minnesota court.
o Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
'1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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specifically stated that Goldberg had "stopped short" of implying that
the Ninth Amendment was applicable against the states.62 This was
done despite the fact that Justice Goldberg's main point was that he
would have applied a Ninth Amendment right to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate the Connecticut law.63
The court also distinguished Loving v. Virginia," in which the
Supreme Court struck down a Virginia anti-miscegenation statute
because it interfered with a "basic civil right" by creating a restriction
based on "invidious racial discrimination." 5 The Minnesota Supreme
court reasoned that the Loving decision hinged "solely on the grounds
of its patent racial discrimination."66 Having distinguished Loving,
however, the court did not assert any reason why a restriction based
on sex would be acceptable, relying solely on its assumption that
marriage is exclusively an opposite-sex institution.
62 Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187 n.3. The Minnesota court stated: "He [Goldberg]
stopped short, however, of an implication that the Ninth Amendment was made
applicable against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. To be fair, Justice
Goldberg's concurrence by its terms does support the limited statement that he was not
applying the Ninth Amendment in its entirety to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492. The concurrence does, however, use the
Ninth Amendment as a basis for asserting personal rights not enumerated in the first
eight amendments, and in that context does apply it to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. id. at 499. Justice Goldberg's concluding paragraph is as follows:
In sum, I believe that the right of privacy in the marital relation is
fundamental and basic - a personal right "retained by the people"
within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Connecticut cannot
constitutionally abridge this fundamental right, which is protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States. I agree
with the court that petitioners' convictions must therefore be
reversed.
Id. Justice Goldberg's concurrence thus located a right of marital privacy in the Ninth
Amendment, and applied that right against the state of Connecticut through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Baker opinion, however, completely ignores the substance
of Goldberg's concurrence, relying on its statement that the Ninth Amendment is not
entirely to be applied to the states. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
SId. at 12.
6Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
7 Id.
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Not surprisingly, the court held that Baker and McConnell
had no right to a marriage license.6S Baker and McConnell petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for review, but their appeal was
dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question.""
B. Jones v. Hallawn
In Jones v. Hallahan,71 a Lesbian couple in Kentucky filed for
recognition of their marriage by the state after their request for a
marriage license was denied. 7' They appealed to the Kentucky
courts, arguing that the denial of the marriage license deprived them
of the right to marry, the right of association, and the right to free
exercise of religion.72 The couple did not, however, persuade the
court. 7"
Kentucky marriage laws did not specifically prohibit same-sex
marriage, but some sections did contain references to "the male and
female of the species."74 The situation in Jones was thus analogous
to that in Baker, and the court used essentially the same reasoning to
arrive at the same conclusion. Quoting reference books that defined
marriage as an opposite-sex union,75 the court held:
Marriage was a custom long before the state
commenced to issue licenses for that purpose .... In
all cases, however, marriage has always been
considered as the union of a man and a woman and
we have been presented with no authority to the
contrary. . . . [Aippellants are prevented from
Id. at 186.
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
70 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
71 id. at 589.
2 Id.
7 Id. at 590.
7' Id. at 589 n.1 (citing KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(5) (Michie 1968) & KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.210 (Michie 1968)).
' Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
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marrying . . . by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined.7'
The court refused to order the issuance of a marriage license to the
couple because "[a] license to enter into a status or a relationship
which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity.""
Having decided that same-sex marriage was by definition
impossible, the court dismissed, almost gratuitously, the federal
constitutional claims in the case.7" Instead of discussing the right to
marry or the right of association, the court cited Baker as precedent79
and asserted that "no constitutional issue is involved.""° The court
then dismissed the claim of the right to free exercise of religion,
saying only that "[tihe claim of religious freedom cannot be extended
to make the professed doctrines superior to the law of the land and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."'"
With similar brevity, the court dismissed the Eighth Amendment
argument with the sentence: "We do not consider the refusal to issue
the license a punishment."82 The court effectively explained the
cursory nature of its consideration of the constitutional claims in its
conclusion -- "the relationship proposed by the appellants does not
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they




"I d. at 589-90. The court also cited Anonymous v. Anonymous, 425 N.Y.S.2d 499
(Sup. Ct. 1971), a case involving a marriage between a man and a person whom he
thought to be female but who was at the time a pre-operative transsexual. 'Because of
the role of deception, the case is not really on point; the defendant basically defaulted
and the issue of whether two people of the same sex have a right to marry was not
litigated. The case is discussed supra note 37.
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C. Singer v. Hara
On September 20, 1971, John Singer and Paul Barwick
applied for a marriage license in King County, Washington." The
request for a marriage license was denied.85 Singer and Barwick
challenged the refusal, saying it improperly denied them the right to
marry under the marriage statutes,86 thus contravening the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Washington State Constitution,87 and the
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. "
Beginning with the issue of whether same-sex marriages were
prohibited by the Washington marriage statutes, the court stated, "it
is apparent from a plain reading of our marriage statutes that the
legislature has not authorized same-sex marriages. " 9 To support this
conclusion, the court pointed out that one section of the statutes
contained a reference to "the female"' and a 1970 amendment to the
section referred to "the male" and "the female. "91 The court decided
that the existence of these references meant that the legislature did not
intend to authorize same-sex marriages, and that therefore same-sex
marriages were not permitted.' The Washington court did not
explicitly say, as the Baker court had, that the lack of specific
authorization was equivalent to prohibition, but its ruling had the
same effect: Singer and Barwick were denied their right to marry.9"
The court next considered the implications of the Equal Rights
Amendment ("ERA"), which provides in relevant part: "Equality of
rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged
'4Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Wash. App. Div. 1974).
s5Id. The license was denied by King County Auditor Lloyd Hara, who thus became
the named defendant in the ensuing court case. Id.
s4ld. (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 26.04.010 (1970)).
s7id. (citing WASH. CONsT. art. 31, § 1).
* Id. at 1189.
89 Id.
' Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189 n.2 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 2604.010 (1970)).
9' id. at 1189.
92 Id.
" Id. at 1197.
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on account of sex."" The court noted that the legislative history of
the ERA included indications that there was a belief that the
Amendment would legalize same-sex marriages, but pointed out that
this belief was sometimes stated by opponents of the Amendment and
that some supporters of the ERA stated disagreement.9 The court
said that it did not believe the people intended to offer same-sex
couples the protection of the state's marriage laws, and that to
interpret the ERA to grant equal protection to same-sex marriages
would "subvert the purpose for which the ERA was enacted by
expanding its scope."" The court concluded that the original intent
and "a common-sense reading"97 of the ERA indicated that "to be
entitled to relief under the ERA, appellants must make a showing that
they are somehow being treated differently by the government than
they would be if they were females."9 ' The judges did not mention
the fact that the appellants would have been treated differently if one
of them had been female.
Singer and Barwick cited to Loving v. Virginia and noted that
the Loving court changed the basic definition of marriage by requiring
the state of Virginia to recognize interracial marriages. 99  The
plaintiffs reasoned that because the Loving court had changed the
definition of marriage through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Washington court was required to do the same with the ERA so that
same-sex marriages were included." ° The court distinguished Loving
by noting that Loving had merely prohibited racial restrictions on
marriage and had not changed "the basic definition of marriage as the
legal union of one man and one woman. "101
9Id.
9 Id. at 1190 n.5.
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1194.
97 Id.
Id. at 1190 n.5.
Id. at 1191. Singer and Barwick also cited a California case, Perez v. Lippold,
198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), with essentially the same holding. Id.
I" Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192 n.8.
101 Id.
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The court argued that the definition of marriage excluded
same-sex marriage.102 The court's argument is
best summarized by the following statement:
[Aippellants are not being denied entry into the
marriage relationship because of their sex; rather,
they are being denied entry into the marriage
relationship because of the recognized definition of
that relationship as one which may be entered into
only by two persons who are members of the opposite
sex. 103
This statement is both contradictory and circular: first, it says that
the reason Singer and Barwick are being denied equal protection of
the laws is not because of their sex, but because of their sex; second,
it says that the reason same-sex couples cannot marry is because
same-sex couples cannot marry.
The court then implicitly conceded that Singer and Barwick
were being discriminated against on account of sex but relied on the
circular definition argument to say that this discrimination was not
invidious and was therefore permissible:
laws which differentiate between the sexes are
permissible so long as they are based upon the unique
physical characteristics of a particular sex . . . the
Io d. at 1192 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) and Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1973)).
Io Id. In addition to repeating this argument several times, the court apparently tried
to reinforce it with additional arguments such as the assertion that it was "so obvious as
not to require recitation." Id. The court, having advanced only contradictory and
circular arguments, satisfied itself by observing that "it is clear that all marriages have
one 'husband' and one 'wife.' In the relationship proposed by appellants, there is no
'wife' and therefore there can be no marriage." Id. at 1192 n.7. The court did have
precedents on which to rely, but to paraphrase a historic criticism of the common law,
it is difficult to think of a worse reason to perpetuate an injustice than that it was done
in the past. See Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.").
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state's refusal to grant a license allowing the
appellants to marry one another is... based upon the
state's recognition that our society as a whole views
marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children. This is true
even though married couples are not required to
become parents and even though some couples are
incapable of becoming parents and even though some
couples who produce children are not married.
These, however, are exceptional situations. The fact
remains that marriage exists as a protected legal
institution primarily because of societal values
associated with the propagation of the human race.
Further, it is apparent that no same-sex couple offers
the possibility of the birth of children by their union.
Thus the refusal of the state to authorize same-sex
marriage results from such impossibility of
reproduction rather than from an invidious
discrimination "on account of sex."104
The court thus generously attributed to the legislature a basis that it
considered rational for restricting marriage to same-sex couples.
Dismissing the imprecision of its basis for the restriction as
inapplicable only in "exceptional situations, '"10 5 the court skirted the
issue raised by the Griswold decision.0 ' Moreover, .the court
conveniently overlooked the fact that no couple past a certain age
offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union, and yet
the state does not attempt to dissolve the marriages of senior citizens
or even to prevent senior citizens from marrying. Indeed, such a
restriction would almost certainly be considered an impermissible,
and unconscionable, denial of the right to marry. But while this
marriage restriction would be unconscionable when applied to other
groups of people who are unable to procreate in the way that some
opposite-sex couples can, the court felt the restriction was perfectly
acceptable when applied to Gay people like Singer and Barwick.
104 Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195.
.10 Id.
06 Id. at 1197.
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The court then analyzed the federal equal protection issues in
the same manner. Deciding that no suspect classifications were
involved, the court applied a rational relationship standard of
review.107 The court repeated that Singer and Barwick "were not
denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were
denied a marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself. "1'8
While acknowledging that other cultures "may have fostered differing
definitions of marriage,"" ° the court asserted that its definition of
marriage was "deeply rooted in our society," and quoted Baker for
the proposition that its definition was "as old as the book of
Genesis. "' " The court added that "subject to constitutional
limitations, the state has absolute dominion over the legal institution
of marriage,""' which appears to contradict its assertion that
marriage is an inflexible institution handed down with the Old
Testament.
Finally, the court asserted that the restriction permitting only
opposite-sex marriages, despite its imprecision, was "clearly related
to the public interest in affording a favorable environment for the
growth of children." ''" Having reached this conclusion with
reference to the equal protection claim, the court decided it was
"unnecessary"1 4 to discuss the claims under the due process clause,
7 Id. at 1196.
108 Id.
109 Id.
no Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197.
It d.
112 Id.
I" Id. The court did not advance any reason for its belief that children would
develop unfavorably if same-sex marriages were recognized, or that the survival of
opposite-sex marriages depended on the non-recognition of same-sex marriages.
Moreover, the correlation between marriage and children has become increasingly
imprecise since Singer was decided in 1974. See Seligman, supra note 33, at 38
(discussing how the definition of "family" has evolved from "[a] group of people related
by blood, marriage or adoption" to "[al group of people who love and care for each
other."). As the imprecision pushes the correlation into the domain of pure fiction, it
will be interesting to see whether courts continue to rely on it in rationalizing their
failure to accord same-sex couples the equal protection of the marriage laws.
"4 Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195 n.11.
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the Ninth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment,"1 5 and held that
Singer and Barwick were prohibited from receiving a marriage
license. 16
D. Adams v. Howerton
Following Singer v. Hara, same-sex couples gave up looking
to the courts for equal protection of the laws until Richard Adams
and Anthony Sullivan decided it was time to try again. Anthony
Sullivan, who was an Australian citizen, and Richard Adams, an
American, had been together for some time when Sullivan's visa to
remain in the United States expired. 7 Like many couples in this
situation, Richard and Anthony explored their immigration options
and decided that the best solution was to marry. They obtained a
marriage license from the county clerk in Boulder, Colorado, and
were married by a minister."' "Adams then petitioned the INS
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] for classification of Sullivan
as an immediate relative of an American citizen, based upon
Sullivan's alleged status as Adam's spouse. ""9 The INS denied the
petition, and Adams and Sullivan filed suit in federal court. Both the
district court and circuit court affirmed the INS decision, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 120
The circuit court opinion began with a careful exercise in
statutory interpretation. The court said that the applicable statutes'2 1
provided preferential admissions for close family members, including
spouses of United States citizens, but that the statutes did not provide
"' Id. The court did pause long enough to mention its opinion that the Eighth
Amendment claim was "without merit." Id.
I1 d. at 1197.




' Adams v. Howerton, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
121 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038 (citing § 201(a) and § 201(b) of-the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1965)).
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a specific definition of the term "spouse." 2  The court then turned
to relevant case law and found that:
a two-step analysis is necessary to determine whether
a marriage will be recognized for immigration
purposes. The first is whether the marriage is valid
under state law. The second is whether that state-
approved marriage qualifies under the Act. 1
The two-step analysis meant that even a marriage that was valid
under state law might not qualify as a marriage for immigration
purposes. 12
The court began with the first step which was to determine the
validity of the marriage under state law.1 21 While Adams and
Sullivan asserted their belief that the marriage was valid, and while
they had obtained a license and been duly married by a minister, the
court noted an informal, unpublished opinion from the Attorney
General of Colorado to a state legislator which stated that the same-
sex marriage had no legal effect in Colorado. 26 The court also
referred to a Colorado statute which neither permitted nor prohibited
same-sex marriages. 27 The court concluded this stage of its analysis
by saying that it was not clear whether Colorado law would recognize
same-sex marriage.1 2' Although the court rejected Adams' and
Sullivan's claim because of their failure to meet the second prong of




125 Id. at 1039. Presumably as an alternative argument, Anthony and Richard
asserted that, even if their marriage was not valid, they were putative spouses because
they had a good faith belief in the validity of their marriage. The court doubted the
merits of the argument, however, stating that they "could not have been without doubts
concerning the validity of their marriage," and that, in any case, putative marriage
provisions "were enacted not to confer validity on the marriage of a putative spouse, but
rather to protect property rights and insure support for children when the invalidity of
such a marriage is discovered." id.
"2 Id. at 1038-39.
127 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039 (citing CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (1973)).
128 Id.
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marriage was legally invalid under state law, a proposition for which
the court could have found ample precedent in Baker, Jones, and
Singer, is interesting. The fact that the court acknowledged that
same-sex marriage might be valid under state law may imply at least
some symbolic progress had been made in the field of same-sex
marriage between 1974 and 1983.
The court stated that it would decide this case "solely upon.
the second step in [its] two-step test which required a statutory
analysis of section 201(6) of the Immigration Act.""" To discover
the intent of Congress, the court looked to the statute and noted that
its definition of spouse specifically excluded some marriages that
might be valid under state law, indicating that it did not intend all
valid marriages to qualify for immigration purposes.13 ° The court
also noted that the construction of statutes by the agencies charged
with their enforcement is ordinarily entitled to "substantial
deference,""13 and that the INS had determined that Adams' and
Sullivan's marriage was outside its construction of the statute. 32 The
court referred to the plain meaning rule of statutory construction and
cited dictionaries for the proposition that. marriage "ordinarily
contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman."13 The
court also observed that other sections of the Immigration Act
"clearly express an intent to exclude homosexuals" and inferred that
it was "unlikely" that Congress intended to give preferential treatment
to homosexual spouses while simultaneously mandating their
exclusion. 3 4 The court concluded that Congress intended to give
preferential treatment only to the spouses of heterosexual
marriages. 5
In deciding whether this discrimination in favor of
heterosexual marriages was constitutionally permissible, the court
asserted that Congress has "almost plenary power to admit or exclude
129 Id.
130 Id.
" Id. at 1040.
132 Id.
" Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (citing WEmSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1384 (1971) and BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th ed. 1979)).
134 Id.
" Id. at 1041.
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aliens" 36 and to make rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.'37 The court concluded that "the decisions of Congress are
subject to only limited review. "'3 The court stated that immigration
laws will be upheld "where there is a rational basis for Congress's
exercise of its power, whether articulated or not." 3 9 The court then
searched for rational bases on which Congress might have relied,
suggesting as possibilities that "homosexual marriages never produce
offspring.., are not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or
. . . violate traditional and often prevailing societal mores. "
Without choosing one of these reasons in particular, the court
concluded that Congress had acted rationally and therefore within its
constitutional authority.14 1
The main flaw in the court's analysis is its excessive
deference to Congressional power over immigration. Congress does
not have the power to suspend Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees of equal protection -- even in immigration. If Anthony
and Richard had been an opposite-sex couple, their marriage would
have been recognized by the INS. Their marriage was not
recognized because they were a same-sex couple, and they were
denied the equal protection of the laws.
E. Baehr v. Lewin
In the first case to complete the trial level in the 1990s, three
same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in Hawaii and were
turned down. 42 They filed suit claiming that the denial of marriage
licenses violated their rights to privacy, equal protection, and due
process of law under the Hawaii state constitution. 14' The trial court
136 Id.
"' Id. at 1042.
138 id. at 1041.
"' Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042.
140 Id. at 1043.
141 Id.
142 Baehr v. Lewin, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 1-3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3,
1991).
143 Id. at 2.
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ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to marry, and the case is
currently on appeal. 144
The trial court began by saying that whether sexual orientation
is protected by the Hawaii right to privacy was an open question, not
previously addressed by Hawaii case law,1 45 but that Hawaii citizens
"can and should expect .. . unfettered freedom to control their
personal and intimate affairs and to select their lifestyle even if it
includes a preference for same sex partners."'14 Then, apparently in
defense of the state's invasion of the privacy of marriage by requiring
persons who wish to marry to choose spouses of the opposite sex, the
court stated, "citizens cannot expect government's policies to support
their lifestyle or personal choices as opposed to those of another class
of people. "'47 That the court would make this argument in defense
of the statute is remarkable, because it is precisely the plaintiffs'
argument: the government's policies restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples have supported a heterosexual lifestyle or personal choice
as opposed to that of another class of people, specifically Gay people,
including the plaintiffs. It is refreshing to see that the court endorsed
the argument, but it is extremely confusing to see that the court
misapplied it so completely.
Continuing in this vein, the court went on to say that the
legislature's decision to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples
"does not infringe upon a person's individuality or lifestyle
decisions." 4" Next, the court cited Baker for the proposition that
"[b]ecause homosexual marriage has never been considered to be a
fundamental right under any known state constitution or the United
States Constitution, the provisions of HRS Section 572-1, do not
violate Article I Section 6 of the Hawaii State Constitution.' 14
9
'" Hawaii Trial Court Dismisses Gay Marriage Case; D.C. Court Hears Oral
Argument, LESBIAm/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian & Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New
York, N.Y.), Oct. 1991, at 65, 66.
'" Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 2.
'46 Id. at 3.
147 Id.
" Id. The court's assertion is clearly false, however, because prohibiting same-sex
couples from marrying obviously infringes on the "lifestyle decisions" available to them.
14 Id.
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Getting away from the privacy issue, the court moved to the equal
protection and due process issues.
A law, such as HRS Section 572-1, which classifies
people into those who can and cannot be legally
married may be subject to strict judicial scrutiny
under Article I Section 5 of Hawaii State Constitution
if it infringes upon a fundamental right or creates a
suspect classification. Otherwise, a law which
classifies is measured by the "rational basis" test. 5°
The court referred back to its decision, based on Baker, that there
was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Hawaii
State Constitution.' By doing so, the court essentially assumed its
own conclusion; the court should have asked whether there is a
fundamental right to marry, and then asked whether same-sex couples
were being denied equal access to that right. By framing the question
as whether there is a special fundamental right to same-sex marriage,
the court confused its equal protection analysis and its due process
analysis. 5 2
The court next turned to the issue of suspect classification.
The court noted that under Hawaii law "a group must have been
subject to purposeful, unequal treatment or have been relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in order to be considered a
S0 Id. at 3-4.
" Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 4.
For an explanation of this distinction in the federal context, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988). Professor Sunstein
points out that due process analysis and equal protection analysis look at history in
opposite ways: due process looks at history to see what rights are deeply rooted and
fundamental, while equal protection looks to see what groups have suffered
discrimination. Id. at 1163. The difference becomes critical in cases like Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which held that the due process clause does not protect
homosexual sodomy. The Hardwick court based its decision on the long history of
prohibitions of homosexual sodomy. Id. at 192-94. But it is precisely that history of
persecution that militates in favor of heightened scrutiny of laws disfavoring
homosexuals. Ironically, Hardwick is therefore one of the strongest federal cases
supporting recognition of sexual orientation as a suspect classification and Gay people
as a protected class in equal protection law.
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'suspect class' for the purposes of constitutional analysis.""' In
effect, because the court stated that the legislature had decided to
restrict the right to marry to heterosexual couples," the court
conceded that homosexual couples who wish to marry have been
subjected to purposeful unequal treatment.
The court circumvented the state issue of the requirements of
suspect classification by delving into federal law. The court stated
that "[n]o federal or state case has ever determined that homosexuals
constitute a 'suspect class, ' "'55 despite the fact that the Federal
District Court in Kansas had made exactly that determination in Jantz
v. Muci 56 more than three months earlier.
153 Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 4 (emphasis added).
I Id. at 3.
s Id. at 4 (citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Inc. See. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodward v, United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
" 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991). Contrary to the court's implication that
sexual orientation classifications could not possibly be considered suspect, at least two
federal courts have held that sexual orientation does constitute a suspect classification
calling for strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d
1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (Watkins 1), superseded and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990) (Watkins II); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.
Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th
Cir. 1992).
In Watkins I, the Ninth Circuit held that homosexuals constitute a suspect class
and that the Army could not discharge an openly Gay Sergeant solely because of his
homosexuality. Watkins, 837 F.2d at 1451. Watkins I was superseded by Watkins II,
which affirmed the reinstatement order but withdrew the suspect classification
determination, holding instead that the Army was estopped from discharging Watkins for
homosexuality because it had previously allowed him to reenlist despite knowing that he
was homosexual. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 708-09, 711.
In Jantz v. Muci, the District Court held that a school principal impermissibly
discriminated against a teacher on the basis of homosexuality (in this case perceived
homosexuality as the plaintiff maintained that he was not in fact homosexual), which the
court held to be a suspect classification. Jantz, 759 F. Supp. at 1552. The Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the principal could not be held liable
because, regardless of whether homosexuals or perceived homosexuals constituted a
suspect class, the question was not clearly resolved at the time of the principal's action
and he could not reasonably be expected to know he was acting unconstitutionally.
Jantz, 976 F.2d at 630. At the time Baehr v. Lewin was decided, the district court
opinion in Jantz had been issued but had not yet been reversed.
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Further, the court recognized the recent passage of a law
prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation,' 7
and concluded that "there is no evidence that homosexuals and the
homosexual legislative agenda have failed to gain legislative
scrutiny. "158 The court's analysis on this point represents a
dangerous distortion of equal protection analysis. By using the
Hawaii civil rights law as a reason not to review discrimination based
on sexual orientation with heightened scrutiny, the court implies that
the passage of civil rights laws undermines the constitutional
safeguards of protected classes. 59 If this were true, then the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would militate against using strict
scrutiny to review classifications based on race. Fortunately, this
distortion appears unique to the Baehr v. Lewin court.
Without explaining its relevance to suspect classification under
Hawaii law, the court next addressed the issue of immutability." °
Citing research by a single researcher working for a clinic related to
the Roman Catholic Church, which has recently taken explicit
political stands against any acceptance of homosexuality, 6" the court
decided that homosexuality had not been proven to be an immutable
characteristic.6 2 The court also cited a Ninth Circuit decision stating
I" Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 5.
15s8 Id.
"9 Id. at 3-4.
' Id. at 5.
6 See, e.g., Roberto Suro, Vatican Reproaches Homosexuals with a Pointed
Allusion to AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1986, at A18 (the Vatican issued a letter,
approved by Pope John Paul II, to all Roman Catholic bishops stating "homosexuality
may seriously threaten the lives and well-being of a large number of people."); Loren
Jenkins, Vatican Adamant on Gays; Letter to Bishops Charges Groups try to "Mislead"
Pastors, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1986, at Al (Vatican document entitled "Letter to the
Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons" stated
"special concern and pastoral attention should be directed toward those who have this
condition [homosexuality], lest they be led to believe that living out this orientation in
homosexual activity is a morally acceptable option. it is not."); Vatican Targets U.S.
in Blast at Homosexuality, CHi. TRiB., Oct. 31, 1986, at 1 (Vatican statement "urged
greater vigilance in opposing the 'deceitful propaganda' of pro-homosexual groups in
church and society.").
" Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 5 (referring to research by Joseph
Nicolosi, Ph.D. of the Thomas Aquinas Psychological Clinic in Encino, California).
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homosexuality is not immutable, 63 but rather "behavioral and hence
. . . fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or
alienage, which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect
classes."'" The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show
that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for Hawaii equal
protection and due process purposes, and therefore reviewed the
marriage restriction under the rational relationship test. 1 65
Applying the rational relationship test, the court decided that
the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage "is obviously designed to
promote the general welfare interests of the community by
sanctioning traditional man-woman family units and procreation.
Clearly, these legislative goals has [sic] been achieved by the legal
classification set forth in the statute. "'s This assertion implies that
the reason people enter "traditional man-woman family units" and
procreate is because same-sex marriages are not recognized, and that
what brides and grooms really want is to marry others of their own
sex -- if only the law allowed. Without explaining a basis for this
belief, the court concluded that same-sex couples did not have a right
to marry in Hawaii.167
F. Dean v. Barry
Perhaps the most incredible refusal to recognize a same-sex
marriage took place in the nation's capital, a jurisdiction with gender-
neutral marriage laws and a human rights law specifically prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. 68 In Dean
v. Barry, 69 Judge Shellie Bowers held that despite the explicit ban on
11 High Tech Gays v. Defense Inc. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990).
11 Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 5-6. For consideration of whether gender
is an immutable characteristic, see supra note 37.
Baehr, No. 5. CC 91-1394, slip op. at 6.
166 Id.
167 Id.
'a See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-101, 30-103 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512
(1981).
169 C.A. No. 90-13892 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1991).
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discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation, the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a marriage license. 70
Judge Bowers asserted that the City Council did not intend to
authorize Gay marriages, as the Council failed to adopt an
amendment that would have done so explicitly.' 7' Judge Bowers
pointed out that words in a statute should be given the meaning
commonly attributed to them. 72 As to the District's Human Rights
Law, Judge Bowers stated that its legislative history did not include
specific mention of same-sex marriage, which he claimed it would
have done if the Council had intended to authorize same-sex
marriage, and thus concluded that marriage was not within the scope
of the Human Rights Law.173 Reiterating the circular argument that
same-sex couples cannot marry because same-sex couples cannot
marry, Judge Bowers stated that the plaintiffs were prevented from
marrying because of the definition of marriage and not by any
unlawful discrimination. 74 Judge Bowers also observed that all past
attempts to obtain a license for a same-sex marriage in American
appellate courts have been denied. 75
Responding to the extensive historical evidence that the
plaintiffs presented to prove that the concept of marriage historically
included same-sex marriage, the court nevertheless insisted that same-
sex marriage was "unthinkable and, by definition, impossible. 1v'76
[The plaintiffs did not prove that] the Church
officially recognized these 'unions' as marriages,
notwithstanding the acts of individual clergymen...
[or that] the state ever recognized them.
[Further], one of the most important characteristics of
'SD. C. Court Rebuffs Dean/Gill Marriage Suit, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian
& Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1992, at 9-10. The
plaintiffs, represented at trial by Professor William Eskridge, Jr., of Georgetown
University Law Center, plan to appeal. Id. at 9.
171 Id.
172 Id.
171 id. at 10.
174 Id.
'17 Id. at9.
" D. C. Court Rebuffs Dean/Gill Marriage Suit, LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES (Lesbian
& Gay Law Ass'n of Greater N.Y., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1992, at 9.
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fundamental moral principles is that they are
immutable .... The Ten Commandments are as
relevant today as they were at Mount Sinai, and their
observance or non-observance no less consequential.
Thus, if homosexual marriage were anathema to
Christian religious dogma and morally repugnant, it
would still be so, regardless of the number of clergy
willing to participate in such a ceremony or the
number of centuries over which they did so. 77
Given the court's reliance on what it called the immutable moral
principles that make same-sex marriage unthinkable and impossible,
one wonders whether any legislation, indeed even an amendment to
the Constitution, would be sufficient to establish same-sex marriage
in Judge Bowers' court.
Two of the existing decisions, Baehr v. Lewin and Dean v.
Barry, are currently being appealed. Dean v. Barry, a District of
Columbia case, is subject to a federal climate that appeared
discouraging when the case was filed but that may improve during the
presidency of Bill Clinton. Baehr v. Lewin, in Hawaii, seemed more
promising until the judge who wrote the lower court opinion was
elevated to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Nevertheless, hope remains
that the plaintiffs in at least one of the existing cases will prevail.
IV. Other States
"All we say to America is be true to what you said on paper. "
178
As each failed attempt to win legal recognition of same-sex
marriage adds to the growing weight of unfavorable precedent, the
case law becomes increasingly discouraging. Nevertheless, despite
the expanding number of jurisdictions in which these cases have been
tried, there remain a number of states whose constitutions express
strong support for individual and religious freedom and whose courts
," Id. at 10.
'71 Martin Luther King, Jr., Address in Memphis, Tenn. (Apr. 3, 1968).
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have not yet been asked to decide a same-sex marriage case.1 79
17 While many state constitutions contain very positive language about equal rights,
some make specific exceptions in the area of marriage. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1
("That all men are equally free and independent; that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness."), ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102 ("The legislature shall never pass any law to
authorize or legalize any marriage between any white person and a negro, or descendant
of a negro."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("All men are created equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty ... and of pursuing their own happiness."),
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("The equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and
shall ever remain inviolate...."), ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 18 ("The General Assembly
shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) ("A
person may not be ... denied equal protection of the laws .... "), CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 7(b) ("A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not
granted on the same terms to all citizens."), CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 7 ("No contract
of marriage, if otherwise duly made, shall be invalidated for want of conformity to the
requirements of any religious sect."); COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 29 ("Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its
political subdivisions on account of sex."); CONN. CONST. art. I, § I ("All men ... are
equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments
or privileges from the community."), CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 20 ("No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to . . . discrimination in the
exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of... sex .... "),
CONN. CONST. art. VII ("No preference shall be given by law to any religious society
or denomination in the state. Each shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers,
rights, and privileges. ... "); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All natural persons are equal
before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and
defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness .... No person shall be deprived of any
right because of. . . religion . . . ."); GA. CONsT. art. I, § I ("No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws."); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All men are by
nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and
defending life and liberty ... [and] pursuing happiness. . ... "); ILL. CONST. art. I, §
2 ("No person shall be... denied the equal protection of the laws."), ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 18 ("The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts."); IND. CONST. art.
I, § 1 ("[AIII people are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
.... "), IND. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen,
or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens."); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All men are, by nature, free
and equal, and have certain inalienable rights - among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty.. . and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."), IOWA
CONST. art. I, § 6 ("All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the
General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or
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immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens."); KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1 ("All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural
rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."); LA. CONST. art.
I, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations.
No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations.");
MASS. CONST. art. I ("All people are born free and equal and have certain natural,
essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties ... in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety
and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex
.... "), MASS. CONST. art. III ("[AIIl religious sects and denominations, demeaning
themselves peaceably, and as good citizens of the commonwealth, shall be equally under
the protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to
another shall ever be established by law."); ME. CONST. art. I, § I ("All people are born
equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness."), ME. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("[AIII persons demeaning
themselves peaceably, as good members of the State, shall be equally under the
protection of the laws, and no subordination nor preference of any one sect or
denomination to another shall ever be established by law ...."), ME. CONST. art. I,
§ 6-A ("No person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied
the enjoyment of that person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise
thereof."); MD. CONST. art. XXXVI ("[A]II persons are equally entitled to protection
in their religious liberty ...."), MD. CONST. art. XLVI ("Equality of rights under the
law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied
the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise
thereof because of religion."); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("[AII persons have a natural
right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness ... all persons are created equal and are
entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law. ... ); NeV. CONST. art I, § I
("All men are by Nature free and equal and have certain inalienable rights among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty ...and pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because
of. . .religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights ...by the state
or any agency or subdivision of the state."); N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 1 ("[AIII persons are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty.., and the pursuit of happiness."), N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 19 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person
be subjected to discrimination by the State because of. . .religion . . . ."); OHIO
CONST. art. 1, § 2 ("All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for their equal protection and benefit . . . ."); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2
("Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured .... Polygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All men are born equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are
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Somewhere among the many states with constitutions that explicitly
protect rights to equal protection, freedom of religion, liberty, and
privacy, it is possible that a court will be found that will enforce
those lofty guarantees and provide all its citizens equal access to the
marriage institution.
Moreover, if one state recognizes same-sex marriage, then the
precedents in other states against same-sex marriage will be seriously
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty . . . and of pursuing their own
happiness."), PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the
individual."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be... denied equal protection
of the laws. No otherwise qualified person shall, solely by reason of race, gender or
handicap be subject to discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or entity
doing business with the state."); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("All men are born equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty ... and the pursuit of happiness."), S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 18, ("No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens...
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens. ... ), S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 26 ("All political power is inherent in the
people, and all free government is founded on their authority, and is instituted for their
equal protection and benefit .... ); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("All free men, when they
form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to
exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public
services."), TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex .... This amendment is self-operative."), TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 6 ("no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of
worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be
necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of
its own mode of public worship."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All political power is
inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority for their
equal protection and benefit. ... ), UTAH CONST. art. III, ("Perfect toleration of
religious sentiment is guaranteed .... [Blut polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited."), UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Both male and female citizens of this State
shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges."); VA. CONST.
art. I, § 1 ("[All men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty..
. and pursuing and obtaining happiness.... ."), VA. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("[AIIl men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience.
S.. mhe General Assembly shall not... confer any peculiar privileges or advantages
on any sect or denomination .... ); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("In their inherent right
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal."),
WYo. CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("Both male and female citizens of this state shall equally
enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.").
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undermined, as they rest on the false assumption that same-sex
marriage is impossible. Establishing same-sex marriage in even one
American state would expose the falsehood of the other states'
circular argument against same-sex marriage. As a result, the
success of a same-sex marriage appeal in one state would be very
likely to lead to success in other states as well. Even without
additional litigation, the recognition of same-sex marriage by one
state could give legal validity to same-sex marriages in every state if
the first state allows out-of-state citizens to marry under its laws. As
one court has noted: "It is the generally accepted rule that a marriage
valid where the ceremony is performed is valid everywhere. There
are, however, exceptions to that rule . . . .,"' Unless states make
a special exception to avoid recognizing the validity of same-sex
marriage, the establishment in one state of valid same-sex marriage
procedures that do not require in-state residence would extend legal
validity to same-sex marriage in every state.
Conceivably, the recognition of same-sex marriage in one
state could result in a successful United States Supreme Court
decision, as the equal protection claim of citizens in other states
would be made more obvious. Such a decision would, of course,
bind every state, and would have the advantage of addressing federal
discrimination as well.
V. Conclusion
Existing statutes and case law deny equal protection of
marriage laws to same-sex couples.' Same-sex couples with
children often must take special precautions to protect their family
relationships; where these precautions are incomplete, and where the
law fails to extend protection to private agreements, the children of
180 Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961) (refusing to recognize the
validity of an incestuous marriage made valid in Italy).
181 The denial of equal protection of marriage laws can also affect couples who may
be considered opposite-sex in some jurisdictions but not in others. See supra note 37
for a discussion of the validity of marriages involving transsexuals and the complications
involved in defining gender in opposite terms.
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families headed by same-sex couples may suffer.182 This inequity
continues despite state and federal constitutional provisions expressly
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws to all persons,"' and despite
numerous challenges by same-sex couples seeking to enforce these
guarantees.'"
Judicial responses that same-sex couples cannot marry because
marriage is inherently an opposite-sex institution are both factually
wrong and logically circular; these rationalizations do not support
continuing discrimination against same-sex couples. Claims that
restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to
a legitimate state purpose of maximizing reproduction are similarly
refuted by the existence of large numbers of same-sex couples raising
children and opposite-sex couples without children.
Efforts to secure same-sex couples equal protection of the
marriage laws are likely to continue until they prevail. As litigation
of the issue enters its third unsuccessful decade,"'5 legislative
initiatives are appearing.186 Given the importance of marriage as an
institution in contemporary society, the validity of same-sex marriage
is crucial to any consistent understanding of equal protection of the
"82 See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting) ("the impact of today's decision falls hardest on the children of those
relationships, limiting their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their
development."). See also Claudia A. Lewis, From This Day Forward.: A Feminine
Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1795 (1988) (discussing
how in the absence of a legally sanctioned relationship, the children of homosexual
couples are without legal protection should the relationship dissolve). But see Loftin v.
Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1985) (granting standard visitation
rights to lesbian co-parent despite lack of biological connection to child).
I" See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18 (same); N.M. CONST. art. 4, § 26 (same); WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 12 (same).
" See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458
U.s. 1111 (1982). Note also that the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power
to enforce its provisions. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
I" The history of litigation in this area does include one successful case. See M.T.
v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (upholding the validity of a marriage
between a male and a person who had been born male but who completed gender
reassignment surgery). For a discussion of M. T. v. J. T., see supra note 37.
I" See Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al; Kay Longcope, Gay Couples Fight for Spousal
Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 1991, at 38.
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laws and the freedom all persons should be able to expect in making
decisions about their own lives.
Otis R. Damnslet

